Police Accountability and Oversight in Nigeria
In February 2023, UNODC organized workshops on police oversight and accountability which focused on police misconduct around elections.
This week, the UNODC again organized a three (3) day Policy workshop to support the effective functioning of mechanisms for cooperation and referral between the respective internal and external police oversight and accountability bodies in Nigeria.
2 years ago, on November 3-4, 2021 GIZ Germany had organised a 2-Day Retreat in Lagos for Complaint Treatment Agencies (CTA). Like the UNODC events, the GIZ retreat had in attendance, representatives of the Nigerian Police Force- Complaint Response Unit (CRU), the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the Police Service Commission (PCS). At both events, I had the opportunity to make presentations on ‘Police Accountability, its importance and relevance in a democratic society’.
Following the GIZ retreat, a committee was set up which sought to (1) Harmonize the efforts of the CTUs and, (2) Ensure coherence for effective information sharing that would enhance their productivity and effective service delivery to the people.
This week’s UNODC workshop, which is part of UNODC’s project on strengthening the internal oversight and accountability mechanisms of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), and all the previous efforts, are welcome and significant to the importance of strengthening police oversight and accountability as means to tackle impunity and restore public trust in the police.
Accountability is an important element in discussion about the ground rules for governance- whether of nations or corporate entities.
Democracy entails that citizens should have influence over their governance. This is particularly important in relation to the Police, given their significant power over the daily lives of citizens. Police are the most central public service in a modern state. In a democracy, police exist to protect the fundamental freedoms of citizens. But their powers also provide the potential for severe abuse of these freedoms. These powers including the power to arrest, search and detain and use force need to be regulated and checked to avoid abuse. Oversight and ensuring accountability for the exercise of these enormous powers are important ways in which policing can become more directly responsive to citizens.
Accountability is not intended to eliminate or undermine power but rather to control it from becoming an instrument of repression and exploitation and to ensure that power is exercised in a transparent manner, and according to rules.The new Police Act 2020 in its preamble captures the essence of the review of the 1943 colonial Police Act, and the passage of the new Act into law- to change the colonial culture inherited at independence in 1960; redefine the philosophy, vision, and operational mission of the Police, and reorient it from a regime police: a brutal and unaccountable Force, to a citizen centered, human rights respecting and accountable police Force of democracy capable of public trust. The Act states the objective as including entrenching a human rights culture, and promoting partnership, transparency and accountability.
The Police Act 2020 contains innovative provisions drawing from the Constitution, particularly chapter 4- fundamental human rights as well as the ACJA, adapting and providing procedural safeguards to regulate the exercise of police powers. Under the old Act, exercise of police powers was left entirely to the discretion of the Police, leading to egregious abuse of powers.
RULAAC has since 2021 established Police citizen groups at national and Zonal levels to promote engagement and dialogue as well as CSO observatories – CSO Support and Oversight Groups- to monitor the implementation of the Police Act and the Police Trust Fund Act and to report infractions.
Avocats Sans Frontieres France (ASF France)/ Lawyers Without Borders and its partners- CAPIO and the NBA established a Police CSO Situation Room in 2021 as a collaborative platform for police, CSOs and other stakeholders to work together to improve respect for human rights by the police in Nigeria.
There have been periodic meetings involving CSOs, office of the FPRO, selected state PROs, the leadership of the CRU, and other stakeholders to review the partnership and progress in the promotion and protection of human rights.
Many complaints of police abuse (especially minor infractions) reported in the Police CSO Situation Room WhatsApp platform were promptly taken up and speedily resolved by the former Head of the CRU and reported back to the platform. This is a proof of commitment by the CRU to promote transparency and accountability.
The NPF Complaints Response Unit (CRU) occupies a strategic place in the NPF’s quest for discipline and accountability. Its core mandate is to ensure accountability in the police.
We have seen increased partnership between the CRU and civil society as well as development partners.
In May 2022, the CRU unveiled its 2021 report published, for the first time, with support from RULAAC as part of a MacArthur Foundation funded project on police reform in Nigeria after EndSARS. That report attracted a Punch Editorial. According to the report, the CRU had received 14,976 complaints against police officers since its inception in 2015 under IGP Solomon Arase. A total of 258 police officers have been punished and 31 dismissed. The unit said N55.6 million in extortion proceeds was recovered and returned to their owners. It said that in 2021 alone, the police received 1,244 complaints.
RULAAC also facilitated CRU’s stakeholders meeting in 2022. Prior to this, the stakeholders meeting had not held. Participation was drawn from the CRU, CSOs, NHRC, PSC, foreign Embassies including the US as well as GIZ and other development partners. It was an opportunity to present the CRU report and solicit more support for the CRU.
There is gradual improvement in police’s openness to engage with CSOs.
Increasing transparency and determination to prioritize accountability manifest in the number of officers punished in recent times for sundry misconduct and publicly announced by the NPF. But these are restricted to petit corruption and acts of incivility captured in video by citizens and exposed via social media. Otherwise, there is an institutional tendency to cover up and fail to effectively and conclusively investigate serious crimes and human rights violations, make the outcomes public, and bring perpetrators to account- if indicted.
For example, report of grave allegations of torture, extrajudicial killings, conversion of money and property of executed detainees and the allegation of organ harvesting by some senior Police officers in Anambra State is yet to be made public despite promise that it would and despite public demand.
The Anti-Kidnapping Unit of the Imo State Police Command is a concentration camp where people randomly and arbitrarily arrested are indefinitely detained, tortured, executed and/or extorted of huge sums of cash. No serious action has been taken in response to several petitions and repeated media reports.
Some police officers with notorious records of human rights violation and impunity refused to respond to summons by the EndSARS panels of Inquiry across the states.
Another positive development: we have also seen – the NPF publicly acknowledge and reward some officers for exceptional conduct or performance.
Still on increased support by civil society …
RULAAC in partnership with a Police Reform Consortium supported by McArthur Foundation also printed concise summaries of the Police Act 2020 and the Police Trust Fund Act 2019 to promote access and enhance awareness.
While we push for accountability and commend the police when they impose disciplinary measures against erring police officers, it is also important to address the root causes of misconduct.
A major risk factor for abuse and corruption is the perennial neglect of the Police and poor welfare which leads to increasing resistiveness by junior officers – often treated as mutiny.
Another factor: corruption at the top makes change at the lower levels difficult.
Capacity gaps and inadequate funding are some of the obstacles inhibiting the PSC and NHRC in effectively discharging their external oversight mandates i.e., effectively addressing public complaints against police misconduct, and tackling impunity. They are therefore unable to meet public expectations.
The CRU also has its own fair share of challenges in dealing with internal disciplinary control.
CRU was established to receive public complaints and speedily treat and resolve them. It was effective at the beginning. But it is no longer able to satisfactorily addresses citizens complaints and grievances and provide feedback to the complaints and the public.
Certain obstacles impede the achievement of this very important objective.
When CRU started in 2015 under IGP Arase, it was able to meet and satisfy public expectations to a great extent. A complainant received prompt acknowledgement by way of a tracking number. They took actions and resolved complaints, in many cases, satisfactorily. That is no longer the case today.
The placement of the CRU under the office of the FPRO brings with it needless and avoidable bureaucratic interference, obstructions and suppression of investigation into some cases, especially when cases involve some senior police officers or friends of some senior police officers.
Connected to this was the sudden directive that petitions/complaints must be approved by the IGP before CRU can investigate. In many cases, it takes weeks and months before the approval is received and, as a consequence of this, the victims would have suffered the violations for which they complained to the CRU.
These interferences undermine the efficiency and effectiveness of the CRU and deepens public cynicism and resentment.
I welcome the renewed interest by the PSC chairman to set up a system to monitor the CRU from his office at the PSC.
The appointment of Arase as PSC chairman brought renewed hope for a reinvigorated and effective PSC capable of providing effective external oversight and control, after dismal performance by previous chairmen, all of whom have been retired IGPs.
In principle, CSOs have always stood against the appointment of retired IGPs to head the PSC. This is a bad practice that destroys the mission and effectiveness of the PSC as civilian external oversight and accountability mechanism for the NPF.We welcomed Arase because of the difference he made as IGP and continues to make. But there are not many Arases in the NPF.
“CSO’s objections to the practice of appointing retired IGPs as Chairman of the PSC are grounded in law and the over-riding goal of preserving and enhancing the institutional effectiveness and credibility of the PSC as well as to secure the role of the Commission as civilian credible and effective oversight mechanism.
“The PSC evinced under the Constitution and the PSC Act of 2001 is an independent and impartial institution. Such an institution is worth fighting for. Appointing a former Inspector-General of Police to head the PSC subverts the independence and impartiality of the PSC.
RULAAC sends petitions on behalf of victims of human rights violations to the CRU, the NHRC, PSC and the ICPC. But these are not usually effectively treated.
CONCLUSION
Accountability is not solely punitive… it also includes building integrity of systems and processes. One thing we see clearly is that there’s a human resource management gap in the NPF. The quality of welfare and training given to the police personnel has significant impact on their operational efficiency and behavioral integrity. Poor welfare and working conditions make personnel prone to corruption and violence.
As CSOs, we are committed to continuing to speak up and advocate for the police, especially with regards to improving funding, equipment, training and retraining and radically improving welfare as a means of fighting corruption and humanizing the police.
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